On 2 June, 293 families, 784 people, were recorded as having fled their homes in Catatumbo, an entry that sat unremarkably among the many before it. Since 16 January 2025, when two armed organisations converted a long rivalry into open war, displacement in this north-eastern borderland has ceased to be an event and become a condition.
The antagonists are not newcomers. The National Liberation Army (ELN), a guerrilla movement founded in 1964 and inspired by the Cuban revolution, has operated here for decades and has never concluded a peace process with the state. Arrayed against it are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) dissidents, fighters and commanders who rejected the 2016 settlement or abandoned it after signing, and who now contest territory with the weapons, and frequently the networks, of the organisation they left. Between the two lie coca fields, contraband corridors and a frontier with Venezuela that armed groups exploit and that neither government has ever effectively administered.
An estimated 100,000 people have been displaced since the escalation, and Catatumbo accounts for a third of all internally displaced Colombians. At least 4,600 of those uprooted are Venezuelan refugees and migrants, expelled once from one country and now from another.
That the region has unravelled so completely is what makes it analytically instructive, for the 2016 agreement had singled Catatumbo out for repair. It received a territorially focused development plan (the PDET), a coca substitution programme and a transitional rural reserve zone. Ms Laura Barrios Sabogal, a Doctoral Researcher at the the PRIF Leibniz Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, does not consider these instruments misconceived, arguing that they addressed “real sources of exclusion”. Their failure, in Ms Barrios Sabogal’s account, lay in tempo and unevenness: a development plan on paper cannot outbid an economy that pays immediately and collects its debts by coercion, least of all where coca buyers, gunmen and cross-border routes are already threaded through ordinary life.
Popular accounts speak of a vacuum, with the ELN rushing into ground the FARC-EP had vacated. The metaphor flatters the state, since the ELN was already present. What demobilisation altered was the distribution of power: who commanded which communities, which routes and which illicit revenues. A realignment of this kind was foreseeable and therefore manageable, and Ms Barrios Sabogal contends that a more attentive state could have moved sooner to shield civilians and former combatants while establishing a credible civilian presence. The transition faltered less by leaving the ELN standing than by neglecting the risks a changing armed landscape would generate.
Along the frontier with Venezuela, the crisis acquires a second layer. Its roots are domestic, since a state that barely reaches the valley, rural reforms left half-built and civilians without protection are all Colombian responsibilities. Yet fighters cross, retreat and coordinate through the same porous line, and so do the goods that fund them. The 2016 text, written to end a war between Bogotá and a guerrilla organisation, made no provision for a boundary of this kind. Implementing it in Catatumbo now requires cooperation across the line in practice, not merely in principle.
Aid agencies, for their part, have worked within tight limits. UNICEF-funded projects improved access and reached 94,000 people in the region, and a response costing just $300,000 across shelters, hotels and concentration points in Tibú, Ocaña and Cúcuta provided displaced families with child protection, schooling, water, health care and nutrition. Nationally, OCHA and the 2026 Global Humanitarian Overview project that 10.4 million people will need assistance, 6.9 million under the national response plan and 3.5 million under the regional refugee and migrant plan. By March, that national plan had received only 11% of the $852 million it sought to assist 2.4 million people.
Scarcity of funds is the lesser loss. Those who enrolled in crop substitution, supported local development plans or left armed groups, only to meet displacement, threats or death, learned that the state’s promises were cheaper than its adversaries’ warnings. Communities grow wary of future programmes, and armed commanders find their case against engagement newly persuasive. Negotiations with the ELN or any other group become harder, not because Colombians reject peace but because those asked to take the first step doubt that Bogotá can protect them. Ms Barrios Sabogal is unequivocal that credible protection is not an appendix to a negotiation but a condition of rational participation.
This vulnerability is distributed unevenly. Human Rights Watch reports that femicides and sexual violence rose in 2024 and 2025, and that women made up nearly 75% of trafficking victims, with sexual exploitation accounting for roughly 60% of reported cases between January and June. UNICEF also found that the recruitment of children by armed groups has risen by 300% in five years; on UN-verified figures for 2024, one child is recruited every 20 hours. Organisations the settlement left unabsorbed are replenishing themselves from its youngest bystanders.
Not all of the settlement’s machinery has faltered. In September 2025 the Special Jurisdiction for Peace issued its first restorative sentence, against seven former members of the last FARC-EP secretariat, for a kidnapping policy that produced at least 21,396 victimising acts. It is a genuine landmark in reckoning with the past, though Catatumbo shows how little accountability for yesterday guarantees about tomorrow.
Scholars of civil war settlements might take from this a sobering lesson about sequence. Disarming one organisation is a finite act, whereas reshaping who controls land, markets, routes and local authority is a long and contested process, and the first can be completed without the second ever beginning. Ms Barrios Sabogal argues that comparative research probably underestimates how quickly armed groups adapt to a rival’s demobilisation, with fragmented commands and local alliances defeating any attempt to manage the conflict through one national deal. The real test is whether people in a territory are offered safer, credible alternatives before a new armed group arrives.
For Catatumbo, the answer so far is no.
Further information and opportunities to engage with organisations working in this area are listed below:
Bringing Hope to Children in Catatumbo Amidst Crisis - Children Change Colombia
ASCAMCAT | Peace Brigades International
Home | Five Senses Foundation
Share your thoughts on this article
Get latest news delivered to your inbox