"The military might of a country represents its national strength. Only when it builds up its military might in every way can it develop into a thriving country." – Kim Jong Un
Throughout the nine provinces of North Korea, hunger is dispersed everywhere. Official statistics indicate that nearly 12 million of the 26.6 million people living in North Korea are currently malnourished.
During the 1990s, 1 million people, equating to 5% of the population at the time, died during a 4-year span. What followed was less of a recovery, and more of an adaptation: informal trade networks, cross-border smuggling, communities exploiting structural fissures within an apparatus designed to restrict them. The songbun system, a caste system that determines access to food, housing and employment based on an inherited loyalty classification, had placed border provinces such as North Hamgyong at its lowest rungs before any indications of famine existed. Subjected to both physical and social marginalisation, populations were compelled to develop alternative survival strategies, catalysing the emergence of informal markets (jangmadang). Following the collapse of the state rationing apparatus during the 1990s famine, citizens increasingly relied on these privatised networks to trade foodstuffs, household commodities, and electronics. Systems which have outlived the 1990s famine.
As the COVID pandemic brewed in Asia, North Korea reacted first, closing its borders in January of 2020. The survival infrastructure created out of desperation became almost immediately occluded.
Out of the shadow of COVID headlines, North Korea’s malnutrition crisis edged slightly closer to the international eye. Dr Andrew Natsios, Co-chair Emeritus of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and former Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), has monitored the sparse indicators for over 20 years. The overarching question is: did the famine ever leave?
Dr Natsios’ answer is no, estimating that between 2017 and 2023 over 100,000 North Korean’s died from a preventable hoarding of state resources, and a lack of political will to redistribute.
The border nominally reoponed in August 2023, having suffered a 6% decrease in GDP compared to 2018 statistics. The informal networks that once sustained communities living on the peripheries of society did not reopen with it. Conversely, North Korea sealed its borders even tighter, particularly its Northern border with China. Shoot-on-sight orders for unauthorised crossings rampantly increased, as border crossings to South Korea declined by 80% between 2019 and 2025. Tighter border controls also choked off trade, as Chinese imports declined by 30% between 2019 and 2024, suffocating the already scanty food supply. The consequences were almost entirely absorbed by the consumers: a year ago, KPW₩50,000 bought roughly 8kg of rice, whereas today it buys 2kg. For households with few alternatives, a fourfold rise in the price of a staple is not simply an economic indicator; it is the difference between eating and not eating.
North Korea, like every country, is not immune to climate change, and the recently induced environmental pressures have compounded the problem. When state media raised alarms in May 2022 over what was described as the second-worst drought in 40 years, likely ongoing, water restrictions were enforced, shutting off 75% of household meters, further degrading already blighted agricultural land.
Approximately 18% of North Korean children were stunted before the border closures and the drought, their physical health compromised at the time where it is most critical to maturation. What the figure looks like now remains unknown.
That uncertainty is structural rather than incidental. Since 2021, there has been no comprehensive UN humanitarian assessment conducted inside the country, with the UN Special Rapporteur noting in March 2025 that government information controls make any meaningful needs assessment impossible. This leaves researchers, such as Dr Natsios, reconstructing the situation from fragments of information: satellite imagery, market prices, and the testimonies of the few who have escaped. Even that testimony is diminishing.
What does filter through the scant pores is no longer confined to the margins of North Korea. Paramilitary forced-labour workers in Musan county, located in central North Hamgyong province, were reported to have abandoned their posts, not out of defiance, but desperation: starvation. These are individuals embedded within a quasi-military structure, presumably deemed reliable enough to deploy, and even they could not be fed. Kim Jong Un himself acknowledged “widespread poverty and economic failure” in late 2024, an unusual concession for a government that has spent decades insisting it is constructing a socialist paradise.
Delivering on that concession faces significant hurdles given the regime's current budget priorities. Pyongyang announced a state budget increase of over 5% for 2026, with 15.8% of total expenditure directed towards national defence, placing it second only to Ukraine. The official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Rodong Sinmun, described increased economic spending as ensuring “stable and sustained development”, with economic construction rising in 2026 to 105.5% of the previous year’s level and accounting for 43.8% of total expenditure. Even with reports of starving workers, Kim Jong Un has made his priorities apparent.
North Korea has most recently sent more than 16,000 military personnel to Russia in specialised roles such as reconnaissance drone operators, artillery crews, and border security, yet lacks the will to feed its own population. Analysts have largely assumed Moscow would compensate Pyongyang with food for its deployment of troops, yet Dr Natsios said he has seen no evidence of large-scale deliveries. Given the poor state of the cross-border rail network, moving bulk food aid would require maritime shipping, he noted.
Meanwhile, the international response has considerably narrowed. The US was once the largest contributor of food aid to North Korea, supplying nearly 2 million tonnes, worth approximately $650 million, across a decade of conditional and fraught engagement. Coinciding with the closure of USAID in 2025, this architecture disappeared. China now remains the only actor with the geographical proximity, diplomatic and economic weight to influence North Korean domestic affairs. Yet Beijing confirmed in 2025 that it planned to "deepen" its relationship with Pyongyang.
Dr Natsios looks for the signs that precede statistics. People harvesting any crops not poisonous, farmers eating their own yield, children being sold to families when they can no longer support them (often trafficked). These are, and should be treated as, indicators of a famine. Only this time the world has the eyes to look.
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